Secure Your Copy On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence Articulated By Norman F. Dixon Made Available In Publication Copy

read with some really thorough analysis, Posed a lot of very interesting theories on military leadership, but it felt like many of them were only applicable to the caste based military structure found in theth andth centuries.
Interesting nonetheless! Interesante análisis sobre las causas psicológicas de a incompetencia militar, Comienza con una breve reseña de grandes desastres militares, enfocados en el ejército británico, y luego realiza un análisis de los puntos en común que tienen las personalidades de los generales que estaban a cargo.


La tesis del autor es que la estructura misma del mundo militar atrae y premia a personalidades autoritarias aunque pueda parecer evidente y que éstas tienen tal falta de amor propio que terminan siendo malos comandantes al descuidar información importante que no calza con sus expectativas, clara indiferencia con el sufrimiento de sus propios soldados, y falta de imaginación y rigidez para adaptarse a las condiciones y tecnologías.


Por oposición plantea que los mejores comandantes son aquellos no autoritarios, con un gran ego a prueba de balas y que por ello pueden reconocer sus errores sin cargarle el muerto a nadie, y con gran capacidad de adaptación.

La primera parte del libro es muy entretenida, mientras que la segunda se vuelve algo pesada.
Aún así, es un excelente ensayo sobre las características del liderazgo, aplicable no sólo al campo militar.
A fascinating first third got mired by Freudian psycobabble about anal fixation and potty training, It recovered a bit at the end though, A good book, providing a deep analysis of the psychological conditions which effect the decisionmaking of military commanders.
The book builds a detailed thesis based on historical observations and application of various threads of psychology.
The basic premise: traits of extreme authoritarianism in a military commander, internally implanted through both emotional foundations childhood and immersion in military culture professional life, can hinder the decisionmaking tempo and decision output needed for battlefield success.
The first part of the book presents a series of case studies of military incompetence, with background characterizations of the commanders involved.
The second part dives into the makeup of authoritarianism, both as a trait developed in childhood and as a characteristic endemic of military cultures.
The final part presents the thesis and through a series of vignettes comparing and contrasting competent and incompetent military leadership, sometimes within the same leader.
The result is a wellargued thesis that attempts to answer all criticisms, The book is a bit dated first edition was in, so Im sure elements of the theory are probably contested by present day psychologist.
But I did grasp a larger concept beyond the very Freudian foundation the author paints a concept with more familiar language in the present.
The military incompetents examined in the book lacked an ability to orient, failed to fully observe their situation, and did not structure their decisionmaking to the circumstances.
Once you get past the sections with Freudian emphasis on demanding fathers, aloof mothers, and fixation on dirt, the book provides healthy food for thought on how a military leader can identify the issues within their innerself which are negatively effecting their professional competence.
Highly recommended for anyone pursuing a military profession and in need of internal improvements,
Make no mistake, this is a psychology book, While the first half is an indepth examination of primarily British military incompetence from, the second half is a psychological examination of the factors that could have caused such incompetence.
The data and theories were still current when the book was written in thes, but would not hold water today.
The book starts with short description of unnecessary carnage in WW, Boer war and Crimea, among others.
Very helpful for someone who is not a historybuff like myself buffs are advised by the author to skip this first part.


Then Dixon tries to psychologically explain what caused these mishaps, quoting from many sources.


For example on British in America p,: "The men in their scarlet uniforms and white spatterdashes, marching in columns, were the sort of target an ambush force dreams of.
som of the British troops broke for cover and fired from behind trees, This appalled general Braddock and his officers they considered skulking behind trees both undisciplined and unsoldierly.
So they drove the Tommies back into columns, where of course they were butchered, " Similarly p.: "A plot to assassinate Hitler during thes was turned down as 'not cricket' the very words used by the Government of the day.
"

Dixon writes in a very pleasant, meandering and natural way, An example of a nice understatement p,: "the Navy did on occasion show a surprising streak of realism, fostered perhaps by the ageold experience of being up against the hard facts of nature and the dangerously low buoyancy of the human body".


On Montgomery and Kitchener Dixon writes p: "Both, when they lapsed, did so as a result of shortcomings in personality rather than intellect".
And p.: "The theory advanced in this book, . . military incompetence cannot be attributed to dullness of intellect, recurring pattern to military mishaps which defies, . . 'bloody fool' theory".

Another factor explaining incompetence: "the fear of failure rather than the hope of success tends to be the dominant motive force" p.
.

The Afterword is also great, and sums up a lot of the content of the book.
It reads in full p,: "Lest the reader should have doubted my qualifications to write this book, let me reassure him that I have marked authoritarian traits, a weak ego, fear of failure motivation, and no illusion about the fact that I would have made a grossly incompetent general.
It takes one to know one!" Probably one of the most important books ever written on how to avoid those mindsets that lead to disastrous outcomes and the lessons are universal in nature.


It's kind of similar to 'Great Military Blunders TV Program' but perhaps more useful as the level of psychological expertise goes a step further.
The best way to read this is to apply it to one's own self and try to cut out our own tendency to arrogance, stupidity, stubbornness, pride, overconfidence, pettiness etc.


Removed one star for the Freudian nonsense near the end ignore that part mostly.
I'm givingbecause of the first third of the book only it narrates with interesting detail some military failures that I knew little about, and which taken together illuminate the arguments against groupthink, homogeneity of thought and the importance of not judging your information based on your emotions cherrypicking.


The rest of the book is verys: lots of Freud, unconscious sexism while trying not to, and occasionally hilarious obsession with potty training.
There is some good stuff in there, but there's also debunked research, and playing spotthenextexcusetomentionpottytraining was quite distracting though irresistible.


If I read it again will definitely only be the first section, This is a really solid, groundbreaking work, though it is dated, especially in its methodology 'some research has shown.
. . '. Still, it is rather meticulous and detailed, and I cannot recall having read or heard of anything like it.
On The Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman F Dixon came out in about, It was a book that I probably should have read during my time in uniforms,s and earlys and I decided to read it now, firstly to see what I had missed and secondly to see if there were any parallels with nonmilitary leadership.
Dixon is a psychologist who had served in the British Army during the Second World War so has sound credentials to write this book.
The focus of the book is on generals, that is senior leaders who have sufficient responsibility for their decisions to have a significant and sometimes catastrophic consequences.
It doesn't address leadership at the midrank or junior officer level, nor the NCO level, The book starts with a number of examples of military disasters that are caused by incompetence and then spends the bulk of the thesis on describing and analysing the psychological traits of the commanders who were responsible for the disasters.
It finishes with examples of good generals who possesses the opposite traits of the incompetent ones and some generals who were successful, despite possessing the undesirable traits.

The key distinguishing trait that Dixon finds in incompetent generals is authoritarianism, as distinct from autocratic behaviour.
After fair bit of reading, it's unsurprising

the learn that generals who are dismissive of views of people from other countries, have a sycophantic relationship with their superiors, treat their subordinates harshly, and don't listen to advice that counters their previously held views, tend to make catastrophic mistakes.
Given that he is British, Dixon spends some time on exploring the formative years of the generals in the British public school system and the officer training establishment, where he contends, these traits are fostered.
He then makes the case that the poor generals, however intelligent, are bound to become incompetent due to the fostering of authoritarian traits.
I think that there are some gaps in this thesis, Firstly, it must assume that the competent generals succeeded in spite of the formative environment that they were also exposed to.
Dixon doesn't explore any quantitative analysis, that is, are the incompetent or competent in the majority Also, it ignores the psychological development that the officer experiences in the early to midcareer.
He uses case studies and examples of experiences and attitudes at school, at the officer training academy and in early career as lieutenants, but no real analysis of theyears that an officer serves from becoming a captain to becoming a general and how that may have influenced him.
And it's only "him" which is appropriate given that the work was published in,
The psychologist in Dixon is evident in his analysis of the attitude to sex and how that influences the general in other aspects.
Basically the hypothesis is that those generals with a liberal attitude to sex were less authoritarian than those with a repressive and prudish attitude to sex.
I wonder how that analysis would stand up to scrutiny someyears later Generals today who have a liberal attitude to sex are dismissed Napoleon and Wellington would not last long in today's armies.

It is true that military academies are now looking more broadly than from a narrow social class for future officers, including more women.
It would be interesting to see a followup analysis of how things have changed sinceand the effect that those changes have had on today's generals.
if at all.
As far as making parallels to civilian leaders, it's not news that authoritarian personality types don't necessarily make great leaders despite what they themselves may think.

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