reports about Sukarno's relationship with Japan, Spit some truth about how bad Sukarno handled things in his presidential era, Mostly contains ideology, money, business, Dewi and Sukarno's jargons, This book treats the relationship between Japan and Indonesia, between an industrialized nation with sparse natural resources and a developing nation with rich natural resources, over the period fromtofrom the time when the two nations began negotiating the terms of Japanese war reparations with Indonesia to the time when President Sukarno lost power after theabortive coup.
First examined is the nature of their interdependency betweenand, comparing their national interests, foreign policies, volumes of trade, flow of people, and frequency of mutual visits by highranking officials.
Then, focusing on contacts between specific individuals and their roles as lobbyists during the fifteenyear period, the study covers the following issues:formal negotiations on war reparations and the Peace Lobbythe reparations funds ofmillion and the reparations lobbiesJapan's role in the IndonesianMalaysian conflictand the Kawashima LobbyproSukarnoist groups in Tokyo, their role in the West Irian problem of, and the impact of thecoup upon themthe antiSukarnoist lobby and its role in the Sumatra Rebellion ofand in the postpreeminence of the military andthe Japanese government's reaction to thecoup.
The research for this thesis is based primarily upon Indonesian and Japanese sources, including government reports, newspapers, popular magazines, biographies and memoirs, as well as academic works, It also draws heavily upon interviews conducted in Tokyo and Jakarta with diplomats, government officials, wartime officers, correspondents, and businessmen,
Among the major findings are:the settlement of the prolonged negotiations over war reparations owes much to the Peace Lobbythe reparations funds functioned as an important source of foreign aid to Indonesia while also serving to promote Japanese exports to Indonesiawhile the Kishi government used the funds to prop up the Sukarno regime, the latter used them to build "prestige projects" and to promote Sukarnoismthe reparations lobbies, which allegedly involved top leaders in the two countries and through which Ratna Sari Dewi was introduced to Sukarno, functioned to tie the two countries together at a time when they were pursuing different ideologiesboth Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato and
the ruling party's Vicepresident Kawashima Shōjirō failed in their attempts to mediate the IndonesianMalaysian disputes, but subsequent personal ties between former diplomat Shirahata Tomoyoshi and Foreign Minister Adam Malik and between Ambassador to Malaysia Kai Fumihiko and Prime Minister Abdul Rahman contributed to the beginning of the postpeace negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysiathecoup shattered the Sukarnoist group in Tokyo after it had earlier been successful inin the West Irian incidentthe postcoup political upheaval also ended the political career of Dewi, who fromtohad acted as a link between Japanese and Indonesian interests and had competed with Subandrio in an attempt to keep Sukarno on her side and have him reach a reconciliation with the militarythe Japan Communist party believed inthat the ultimate responsibility for thecoup lay with Peking and subsequently broke its ties with that country partially for this reason andrightwing nationalists and former wartime officers supported the Sumatra Rebellion ofand remained in contact with anticommunist and antiSukarnoist military leaders, providing the basis for the Japanese government's swift shift of support to the Suharto regime in March.
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