Unlock Now Why We Lost: A Generals Inside Account Of The Iraq And Afghanistan Wars Designed By Daniel P. Bolger Released Through Publication

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Great book well written nicely done outline of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Hope we learned the lessons from these wars of counterinsurgency and avoid them in future I'm going back to the summarizing Epilogue to search again for a simple sentence or two explaining "why we lost.
" It didn't jump out at me the first time, and it didn't the second, Was it that our most senior officers set and executed bad strategy Was it that the Iraqi and American political leadership didn't give our military a free hand Was it that we didn't think through the costs in blood and treasure of nation building

All of that is suggested in the book.
Is it my reading ability failing me, but why didn't the author spell it out He's a fine writer, evidenced by this book and his superb Army Magazine essays and reviews.
A very capable writer, he would have had little trouble making himself clear,

I was looking for just one paragraph that started with "We failed because, . . " and then a list of reasons given, Never found it. Still, we'll benefit from reading "Why We Lost" even if, as I believe, the author pulled his punches,

Granted that I lack General Bolger's experience and intelligence, but here are my attempts to answer why we "lost, " Among other things:
great field commanders like LTC Nate Sassaman were not sufficiently supported, were in fact fired
we had idealistic notions epitomized by LTG McChrystal's rules of engagement in Afghanistan, by the disbanding of the Iraqi military by Paul Bremer, by the willful ignorance of the millennialong enmity between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq and the role of the Pashtuns in AFG that we could gain the love of the local population
NCOs and junior grade officers failed to control the "Field Grade Privates" at Abu Ghraib, causing us indelible harm with the Muslim world shame being a cancer hard to remove
most of all, to have the hubris to think we could or should rebuild nations that were still ruled by tribe, clan and family.


Powell was wrong with his "If you break it, you own it, " Sounded good, but was neither true nor doable, I propose "Break it if you have to, then let those who are more capable fix it, "

Our thousands who died, the many more maimed physically and mentally, are owed, at the very least, that we will never make these mistakes again, I wish General Bolger had stated the mistakes clearly enough so that we never will, An honest appraisal of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan,

A good read, Might be a little tedious for those not familiar with military operations, I enjoyed the detail of some of the individual engagements, Daniel P. Bolger is a retired Army lieutenant general, He has served for thirtyfive years in the U, S. military with distinction, having served in positions of command in both Iraq and Afghanistan, He is a history professor at West Point, If anyone could articulate the reasons why we failed in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would most likely be him,

Unfortunately, even after reading his fascinating if convolutedpage book “Why We Lost”, the answer is still not very clear, It may not be his fault, though, It may simply be because the book is mistitled, It should be titled, "Why We Are Still Losing",

He starts by blaming himself, Literally. His first line in the book: “I am a United States Army general, and I lost the Global War on terrorism, p. xiii”

Its a bit harsh and probably unfair, but the point he is trying to make is wellmade and valid: he and other military leaders didnt have the wherewithal or gumption to convince the politicians that going to war in Iraq was a bad idea to begin with.
Subsequently, their second mistake was being unable to convince the politicians that sticking around in both Afghanistan and Iraq after the initial occupation would inevitably create more problems than it tried to solve.


It boiled down to hubris: “Despite the unmatched courage of those in U, S. uniformincluding a good number of generals who led their people under fireour generals did not stumble due to lack of intellect, Rather, we faltered due to a distinct lack of humility, Certain we knew best, confident our skilled troops would prevail, we persisted in a failed course for far too long and came up well short, to the detriment of our trusting countrymen.
p.”

Bolger begins the story of the debacle with the success of the U, S. s first endeavor in Iraq, Desert Storm, led by Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf, That extremely briefwin was, in Bolgers assessment, a refreshing taste of victory for the U, S. military, after almost two decades of forgettable minor skirmishes and a country still reeling from Vietnam,

The U. S. military needed that win, according to Bolger, We needed to feel great again, Unfortunately, a feeling of greatness is often accompanied with a feeling of selfrighteousness, We got cocky.

Then,/happened. There was that national sense that our mother just walked into our bedroom while we were masturbating, It was devastating. We had to save face,

Afghanistan was justifiable, Unfortunately, we didnt follow through, and then we decided to commit ourselves to another war in Iraq, which wasnt exactly justifiable,

Bolger writes about the failed search for weapons of mass destruction WMD, the success of General David Petraeus, the infamous Rolling Stonearticle about Stanley McChrystal.
He writes in detail about some key battles, detailed accounts based on interviews with soldiers on the ground,

He admits that one of the main problems of both wars was that, as both wars progressed, it became obvious that we didnt really know who the enemy was.
Was it AlQaeda Was it the Shiites Was it the insurgents Was it the entire Afghani and Iraqi population Because, at some point, all of these groups became the enemy.


As Bolger writes, “Every man shot by U, S. soldiers wore civilian clothes. If he had an AK, was he getting ready to shoot you or merely defending his family If he was talking on a cell phone, was he tipping off the insurgency or setting off an IED, or was he phoning his wife p.
”

For those of us who dont wear the uniform, this helps to put into perspective the unbelievable daily stress of the soldiers on the ground, What it doesnt help to clarify is why we stayed so long,

Bolgers book is, if anything, worth reading solely for the historical overview, It is a thoroughly researched, extremely wellwritten, and, at times, suspenseful story of war, Its not a stretch to say that it is as riveting a read as any novel by Tom Clancy,

But one never forgets that it isnt a novel, An overview from the First Gulf War to the Second with Afghanistan to boot, I found myself recognizing many of the names and the places, especially those around the Fallujah and Ramadi areas circa, Recognition made this subject even more interesting on my part,

The author discusses the pros and cons of the first Gulf War, The fantastic redemption of American military arms after the loss of Vietnam, Ahr campaign that ended in a successful termination of hostilities and images of the burnt out Iraqi column on the Highway of Death, I still remember burnt out tanks and blown apart bunkers in Kuwait, Or was it a victory Shiites who rose up again were slaughtered when we allowed the Iraqi Army the use of their helicopters, They paid us back in Sadr City, Also the Iraqi's were so kind to oblige us with the exposure of their divisions and fixed positions, Our airpower made short work of

the Iraqi army so thankfully exposed to our airstrikes and TLAM missile shots,

Later we invade Afghanistan with a perfect Blitzkrieg that would make Rommel proud, Except this isn't what we want, We did it but lost interest, Al Qaeda was knocked out, But we gained a new enemy, the Taliban, These Taliban were the same people we armed during their war with the Russians, Iraq became a new shiny object, We were overzealous due to our quick victory and moved on, We turned over Afghanistan to NATO and went off to Iraq,

The knockouts continued, Saddam's armies crumbled under the lightning strikes, The Iraqi Air Force never even took off, Baghdad was ours in a matter of weeks, Yet again, visions of the future emanated, Fedayeen civilian irregulars put up more of a fight than the regular Iraqi army, Later we dismissed the Sunni Baathists and Army and the Shia filled the void, The Sunni insurgency was born and Zarqawi's AQI became a menace, The Golden Mosque was bombed and now we had a sectarian civil war,

Iraq bogged us down while slowly the Taliban recovered, Iraq and Afghanistan became slugging insurgencies similar to Algeria, Vietnam, and other worse places, How did we let ourselves get wrapped back up in guerrilla wars, . . remember we swore we would not do that again, Hubris. We got cocky. We thought we could pull it off, . . meaning the US fighting men and women could do it, Just like they always do, In this case we could not, We had to leave and hope for the best, ISIS, Taliban, Iran resurgent, who knows where it will end up,

A good book for a long weekend, Enjoy. Im giving this.rounded up to four even though I disagree with some of his conclusions, Also, this book is titled, “why we lost” and although he addressed this in the beginning and the epilogue, the second half became a mix of overview and relating specific incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The book was well written, interesting and he makes good points, I think as long as a person doesnt rely only on this book for their view of the wars this can be an informative read, .