Capture The Great Fear: Stalins Terror Of The 1930s Picturized By James Harris Conveyed As Electronic Format

book. Reading the book, and the new evidence that it discloses regarding the actions taken by Stalin and others, is very thoughtprovoking.
Among the many questions worthy of consideration that the book can raise in the mind of the reader are the following:

.
Changed perception.

A. Should the public perception of Stalin be changed to any significant degree by the additional evidence that has come to light following the opening of the Soviet archives

B.
Or has the historical image of Stalin become so embedded in the minds of the public that such image has not, and will not, be changed

to any significant degree by any new evidence obtained as a result of the opening of the Soviet archives

C.
If, and to what extent, has the public's perception of Stalin been changed by new evidence that has come to light following the opening of the Soviet archives

D.
Is there any significant additional new evidence that is expected to be uncovered from now on going forward that is likely to result in any future changes in the public's perception of what Stalin did and why he did it

.
Misunderstanding.

A. Is it true that "Stalin's great terror is among the most misunderstood moments in the history of theth century"

B.
If so, why is that Is it because that misunderstanding of that terror is caused by, or compatible with, or contributes to satisfaction of the political, emotional, or other needs of those who misunderstand those actions and that time period

.
Emotional or rational responses.

A. If, and to what extent, were the actions taken by Stalin that constitute what is considered to be "the terror" motivated or driven by X the emotional responses of Stalin, and/or Y rational analysis by Stalin

B.
If, and to what extent, is the conclusion that there was no substance or material evidence supporting the claims against a majority of the victims of state repression that they were participating in counterrevolutionary conspiracies based upon exculpatory evidence that came to light after the time of terror, and not before

.
Justification for seeking power.

When it is said that the terror represents "the culmination of Stalin's struggle for total power", what criteria should be used to determine how much power it would be reasonable for a head of state to seek to use in the management of the government, when the government is perceived to be threatened internally, and by other nations, to the same extent that the Soviet Union was threatened

.
Intelligence gathering.

How does the extent to which Stalin used "the apparatus of intelligence gathering to keep a careful watch" on domestic and international individuals and groups compare to what was done, and is done, by other governments that perceive significant internal and external threats to the present and future existence of their nations

.
Evaluating decisions using information not available to the decisionmaker,

Should history judge the decisions made by a head of state based upon either X what the head of state knew at the time that decisions were made and actions taken, or Y what comes to light at a subsequent date

.
Relationship of reaction to the degree that state is at risk,

A. Did the other nations that Stalin viewed as a threat to the Soviet Union then, or thereafter, they themselves overreact to what they perceived as risks threatening them and, if so, how did their overreaction compared to the alleged Stalin overreaction

B.
Was it logical, or foreseeable, that Stalin, and the Soviet Union as a whole, would feel more insecure, and act accordingly, than other nations, when faced with such foreign and domestic threats perceived, given the prior history of foreign invasion of Russia and the Soviet Union

.
Considering the circumstances.

A. Was Stalins perception correct that the Soviet Union was at one point during the rule of Stalin was so economically and militarily “ behind the advanced countries” that it was reasonable for Stalin to conclude under the circumstances that unless the Soviet Union eliminated that deficiency with some promptness that certain foreign countries would “crush” the Soviet Union”

B.
How does the nature and extent of the brutality attributed to Stalin compare to the nature and extent of the brutality attributed to those who were opposing Stalin

C.
In justifying actions to be taken in the furtherance of what they perceived to be their national interests, was Stalin any more or less likely to believe that “the end justified the means” than the leaders of Stalins perceived domestic or foreign opposition

D.
If, and to what extent, was the information that was provided to Stalin by his intelligence services, upon which he based his decisions, “flawed” in comparison with flaws in the information provided to the foreign enemies of the Soviet Union by their intelligence services

E.
If, and to what extent, did the ability of Stalin to gather information, and carry out the decisions and actions he preferred, depend upon the good faith and cooperation of other individuals, who were not totally within the control of Stalin and who themselves from time to time had their own personal objectives, ambitions, and views that conflicted with those of Stalin

.
Selfish motives of others.

If, and to what extent, were some of the claims ultimately shown to have wrongfully been brought against innocent people in the Soviet Union initiated not by Stalin, but instead by other individuals in the Soviet Union who asserted such claims against such innocent people to “eliminate” such innocent people for opportunistic personal or competitive reasons or to deflect blame

I suspect that a consideration of these questions in light of the newly disclosed evidence may cause the reader to have a deeper understanding and more comprehensive assessment of Stalin, and his times, than was previously possible.
A very worthwhile read.
An absorbing and compulsively readable account of the events leading up to Stalin's purges during the Great Terror.
Harris argues compellingly that the reason behind Stalin's purges was not that he was a sadistic dictator obsessed with consolidating his own power, but rather he had become convinced that there were plots and conspiracies against him and his regime.
Some of this information was true, but most was exaggerated, Most of all, during the first Five Year Plan, the economic goals were so unreachable that local officials inflated numbers and blamed their failure to meet quotas on sabotage of workers and counterrevolutionaries.
When Stalin had his police look into the industrial records more carefully, all of this corruption was revealed, and so his worst fears of a conspiracy against him were seemingly confirmed.
This all led to the crackdowns and repression of the Great Terror,

Harris situates Stalin within the tradition of Russian rulers who had a history of betrayals and regime changes.
He argues that he was right to suspect plots against him, but that the information gathered from his police was unreliable and was subject to further corruption from political officials jockeying for position beneath him.
This seems like a more reasonable explanation than that Stalin was a singularly evil individual, Description from sitelinkPushkin House: Today we turn our Pushkin House Recommends spotlight on THE GREAT FEAR: Stalin's Terror of thes by James Harris Oxford University Press.
This title presents a new and original explanation of the Stalin's Terror as a destructive force in terms of human life and the state that provoked the events.
It also uncovers new evidence from the Russian archives and is the first Englishlanguage monograph to be written on the Terror inyears.
.