Immerse In The Specter Of Communism: The United States And The Origins Of The Cold War, 1917-1953 (Hill And Wang Critical Issues) Expressed By Melvyn P. Leffler Presented In EPub
you ever want to hear a lukewarm ciriticizm of us cold war policy, along with a halfass defense of soviet cold war policy, heres the book for you.
this book was like kind of short too, and theres likerussian names withsyllables that i dont even know who they are.
A rather succinct summary of early Cold War drivers, I found it quite interesting and informative, The footnotes are a great starting point for further research, Enlightening, but extremely repetitive. Well, I got distracted from reading this while doing separate research, but put together, this book is a concise, yet enlightening read.
It's not always the most engaging, and can feel a bit repetitive, but it wonderfully succeeds in getting across the main point that the Cold War was an ideological struggle that predates its given time frame, which is complicated in the postWWII years by geopolitical issues dealing with economic struggles, power vacuums, and military strength.
This book is useful for both those in the field, especially when it came in inwith newly released sources from the Soviet Union, and undergrads, or anyone new to the field.
It can be a bit overwhelming with the amount of players discussed, but knowing who did what when and where comes over time with studying a seriously complex era global interactions.
While I enjoyed this book, I did not find it to be much of a page turner.
It is a brief introduction to the perceptions in the U, S. , and to some extent in the U, S. S. R. , that led to the Cold War, Leffler frames U. S. motivation for the Cold War as a global desire to establish democratic capitalism to keep markets open, mostly for the benefit of Western Europe and Japan, which in turn was intended to keep the U.
S. from becoming an allyless, tradepartnerless garrison state, This motivation was certainly at least partially justified, but there is no denying it was also largely fueled by paranoia and a tendency to focus on worstcase scenarios.
At the end, Leffler points out the irony that many American economic and personal liberties were eroded in service of this goal, and he slightly alludes to Eisenhower's role as an imperfect savior who, while working to establish a "militaryindustrial complex", played a key role in keeping it from totally consuming American life as it otherwise could have.
I give this only three because I think the narrative struggles to stay interesting in the final two chapters, and it reads as more of a laundry list of facts, but perhaps this is inevitable in such a brief treatment of the origins of the Cold War.
An enormous achievement in concise history, You'll be a touch lost if you don't possess a modicum of historical understanding in regards to the Cold War.
. . but if you do, you'll sit back in amazement, admiring the author's ability to compact so many events into such an effective little volume.
This is a concentrated, sugary squirt of history, smack into the gap between your brain's hemispheres, Dry college reading. Sometimes interesting, but not worth it for how short the book is compared to how long it took to read it.
Melvyns main thesis is that “the Cold War was waged abroad to maintain a political economy of freedom at home.
” That the Cold War brought that promise of economic freedom only to capitalist elites, or that it permanently moved PostWar U.
S. from the New Deal framework to military Keynesianism is fine with Melvyn,presidential Candidate Henry Wallace said, fighting communists with guns a blaze will only make the world fear us.
Why not show all tempted countries instead that we have the best system/product and they will follow us instead with their hearts and wallet and millions wont have to die in needless wars just to increase war profiteering Centrist Melvyn also says he thinks the Cold War was great because it meant one united bipartisan foreign policy.
Less clutter. Maybe Melvyn has OCD. The millions of dead in Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia PKI Massacre, East Timor, Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Cuba, and dozens of other countries dont bare a mention in Mels stupid book about the full price of the Cold War.
Too much clutter. Melvyn has the balls to mention Mosaddeghs removal inin Iran but reports it only as fact and includes no moral qualms seemingly fine with it and all the decades of Cold War killing under the Shah and the SAVAK.
Melvyn states the Cold War rightfully happened because Communism is “a hostile ideology”, Lets say for a minute that is true, But centuries of US settlercolonialism against NativeAmericans was also a hostile ideology, Centuries of enslavement of US Blacks sure looked like part of a hostile ideology, To the wants of the, U, S. led Neoliberalism has only been an hostile ideology, Facing the extinction, Capitalism looks completely hostile, Has bipartisan support for permanent illegal war been hostile has centuries of American Foreign Policy been hostile or centuries of intitutionalized US Patriarchy and Racism been hostile But centrist Melvyn conveniently ignores all those sides.
Now that most of the Cold War fears have long been discredited by Noam and others, its hard to read this without rolling ones eyes thinking, “Oh joy, one hundred and thirty pages glorifying the Cold War and Truman”.
This book is almost at the level of “the Cold War as a success because those commies would have killed us if they could”.
Kudos to Melvyn for daring to mention the obvious Cold War down side of millions of dead, especially the dead of North Korea and Vietnam, the excesses of Senator McCarthy, government testing on civilians, and that CIA was wrong to destroy elections in Italy and Greece PostWar because of an overstated threat.
However, when Mel mentions the fall of Soviet Communism, he ignores totally that Brzezinski had consciously given Afghanistan to Russia as their own protracted Vietnam to bring them down.
Historians are supposed to cover power not cover FOR power, Whats up with Mel He doesnt even feign concern when he says the Red Scare forced screenwriters in thes to stop tackling social issues.
He just worries about the myth of white America being humiliated on the Global stage, White paranoid fantasies you cant trust any poor country being tempted by the only offer, communism, when no other country will step up to also help Yawn One some pages you think Leffler is concerned with the rest of us about the colossal violation of basic human values caused by the Cold War, and then on others you wonder is Leffler halfway to having a pinup poster of Curtis LeMay tacked above his bed.
A great introduction to the events leading up to the Cold War from a centrist/neoliberal perspective mostly uninfluenced by ideology.
. . a nonbiased, just the facts summary if you will, As much as that's actually possible
Learn the past to move into the future You simply are not going to find a more concise, clear, and effective summary of the causes of the Cold War and its first decade than this one.
In aboutpages, Leffler walks through the roots of this conflict mainly from the US perspective, but he skillfully incorporates the secondary literature from the USSR, Great Britain, and other critical countries in this history.
He moves along quickly but with enough depth to give you a bit of color and a clear sense of motives, perspectives, etc.
He does one thing I really like in Cold War history: describing how the participants interpreted each other's motives and actions but then explaining what "We Now Know" through recent releases of documents and historical work.
Obviously Gaddis' book of that title is the gold standard on that topic, but you can get a very similar treatment from Leffler in/of the time.
Here are a couple of the major themes from this book, or at least some new things I picked up.
For Leffler, it is obvious that the US would be hostile to the USSR, and vice versa, for cultural, ideological, political, religious, etc, reasons from its inception.
To get a Cold War, though, you needed the expansion of Soviet power and the ability to threaten vital US interests.
After WWII, the US leadership believed that key regions of the world like Europe and Japan needed to be rehabilitated and integrated into a more open global economy and political order.
The immediate postwar threat wasn't so much a litany of aggressive Soviet actions although they certainly were brutal and extractive in their treatment of Eastern Europe but the possibility that the failure of places like Western/Central Europe and
Japan to recover from the war would create openings for communist infiltration or neutralism.
The greatest fear was that the Soviets would gain the resources of an entire continent either Europe or NE Asia and project that power against an isolated US.
As a side note: I really got from this book why the US saw SE Asia as so strategically critical: with JP surrounded by Communist states on all sides, the possibility of SE Asia falling as well would leave JP isolated and probably force it to drift toward the Eastern Bloc, creating the specter of a continent under communist control.
The US, Truman and others thought, would then have to become a "garrison state," a permanently and heavily armed country mobilized for war at all times and, ultimately, a less liberal and democratic society.
The Cold War was originally conceived as a way to avoid that outcome, Of course, Leffler goes through the back and forth of escalating events and perceptions, including Stalin's remarkable blunders based on his belief that the US would be endlessly understanding of his need to ensure friendly countries along his border.
I still kind of think the Cold War was largely the Soviets fault I know that's not a very historical question, but Leffler does a good job skirting that question and unpacking the steady escalation of this conflict and the US adoption of the role of hegemon, which despite its negative connotations really means a predominant power that guarantees some kind of order in a region.
He duly notes that US hegemony was far more negotiated and consensual than the cage of Soviet control.
This is a book I might assign to an undergrad class on the Cold War, although it might be a bit old at this point.
I will definitely reference it a lot in my own research as a reliable and concise guide to a complicated topic.
Worst ever account on the beginning of Cold War, To that, again comes the biased perspective, Page: Stalin killed millions of his own people and sent to GULAGs fucking EVERYONE it literally says everyone who was a prisoner of war.
My Great Grandfathers brother was a prisoner of war, He was rescued and he has never been to Gulag, This is a horrible mistake to make in a historical research, S. V. Vishnevsky, rescued in, never sent to GULAG, M. F. Lukin, rescued inAND GIVEN BACK his rank of generallieutenant, Stalin himself wrote on his case that “This man can be trusted and this man needs to get his rank back”.
Stop making it seem like he killedmillion, when in fact he killed less than a million.
He was a horrible person, which my country will never recover from, but again, this is history.
You do not bring tour opinion in history, you bring facts, I would hardly encourage all Americans to google what ГАРФ, Ф Оп Д Л.states, or at least google the statistics, This is a horrid mess that needs to be corrected,/stars
L. V. Georgiev is was my Great Grandpas brother by the way, He was taken prisoner of war in, It is my familys history and it is being dismantled right in front of my eyes by idiots like Leffler.
I am triggered, indeed, I can not not be triggered because if I was an American student, who was brainwashed that Stalin killed millions for the entirety of my life, then I would have believed it however, I have facts and historical archives on my hands before reading books such as these.
Know your history. Do not let them falsify it,
Have a great day, .